Winter Banter Thread

[USCG RS]

On 2/15/2023 at 1:12 PM, LibertyBell said:

Thats an awesome thread I read it to the end and when he concluded about the government and media response leaving a lot to be desired

 

19 hours ago, Brasiluvsnow said:

agreed, it was very insightful thats why I shared it

Inciteful - Yes. But still missing a plethora of things - some of which I believe could provide even further light on the situation. 

1) You had a local Fire Dept, ill-equipped to handle an actual Haz Mat Emergency. While all FDs are trained on Hazmat, etc.. the smaller the Dept, the less training you have for a major Haz Mat incident. Even Class 1 (ISO Class) Depts are many times ill prepared to handle the immediate aftermath of a Haz Mat incident of this scope. The immediate responding FD/EMS/PD was from a town of 5K persons with -I believe- an all-volunteer Dept. These volunteers work other jobs for a living and dedicate their time to assist the community. As such, they are rarely trained to handle anything outside of a "routine" emergency (Ie - House Fire, Motor Vehicle Accident/Crash, Medical, Etc). Compound that with the fact that this small Dept likely has little in the way of funding for these types of emergencies and well - You're crippled out of the gate. 

2) All emergencies are Inherently local. This is what is taught -and I believe to be true - in the National Response Framework (NRF), which are the guidelines provided to all local Emergency Managers for how to react to all Emergencies. So how does this affect East Palestine, Ohio? 2 Ways. First, we already discussed that the responding Dept is ill equipped and funded for this type of emergency. Secondly, the NRF would then provide a manner in which to scale up the Response. So, the Incident Commander (IC) -Sometimes a Unified Commander (UC) depending on the set up of the response- has to quickly determine the nature of the incident and how to properly scale; Ie what is needed to scale. In this case, you would need to ascertain the scope of the Incident, what is the cause of the fire, how you are going to need to respond to the fire and what other hazards are around. A seasoned IC can relatively quickly ascertain this, however, you have a unique situation (Serious HazMat) with a likely skeleton crew (Volunteers who have to respond during working hours) with a crew that may or may not have ever even been trained for this type of incident (and by training - I mean actual training, not mandated slide training). Therefore, the IC is at an immediate disadvantage and is incredibly outmatched with regards to resources needed. So, we scale up. The closest ISO 2 dept (ISO is 1-10, with 1 being the best and most ready to respond - 2 is a pretty good ISO) is Youngstown, approximately 20 miles away. Then you have Pittsburgh (ISO-1) about 50 miles away and Cleveland (ISO-2) about 85 miles away. This leads to my next point;

3) The Depts listed above are well funded and equipped to handle these types of incidents (or as well as a local FD can be), however you have several issues. First, it is going to take time to mobilize these units. Dispatch has to liaison with these Depts and explain the situation. Assuming there are Mutual Aid Contracts in place, the process is somewhat streamlined. Without these contracts (50/50 chance), the process becomes further complicated. No contract means no formalized manner in which the mutual aid unit responds, no promise of response, and most importantly - the mutual aid Dept may not have a standardized manner in which they can scale themselves up to meet the need of the requesting Dept. However, let us assume that the mutual aid Dept. has an agreement. The mutual aid Dept. is going to have to call in reserves/persons not working. Perhaps, one unit can be immediately spared, however, remember, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Etc, are all busy Depts and they are scheduled to handle their own depts issues -with little wiggle room to spare. Now, most mutual aid agreements are penned based on the idea that a large fire (Non-Hazmat), large Motor Vehicle Crash, etc has occurred. These agreements are not penned with the idea of a multi-state Haz Mat disaster in mind. It is not that this is never thought of, it is simply the fact that a response of this magnitude is going to need a plethora of depts (National, State, Local, Federal & even Private). But I digress, let us pull it back from this Rabbit hole for a minute. Mutual Aids are going to take time. Haz Mat Mutual Aids are going to take longer; and this is not even mentioning the Federal Mutual Aid Response needed. So what happens now? You have an IC on the scene of a nightmare, with very little information, significantly limited resources and a ticking time bomb. Let us go to the next point.

4) Information. Information is scarce when you first pull up. It has likely been dispatched as a train derailment. Beyond that -most likely- the First Responders are gathering the info on their own. So, Responders pull up to a scene. You have a fire and you have a massive derailment. We do not know what chemicals we have, what is burning and how many injured/casualties. First responders are looking for placards, however, they may not even be able to find them at first. Remember, this is a derailment. the placards could be damaged, missing, destroyed, obscured, etc. Then, you have to communicate with the hauling company, which also takes time. What is on this train? How many of the substances are on this train? Etc. Etc. Etc. While the placards - if located- will tell you the substances, it will tell you how much. Likewise, the manifest is on every train. However, again, this is a derailment. Is the conductor alive? Can they reach the cargo manifest? Is it damaged. Heck, is it complete (I have been on many scenes where, well, let's just say humans cut corners and/or make mistakes). Information is scarce. That withstanding, the Thread in question explains very well how the information is obtained and how it works from here with that regard. 

5) Humans are responding. Humans whose family live in the town they are trying to protect. Humans are outmatched, underfunded, overworked, and not even paid. Humans, who are fighting panic. We all become scared and we all fight panic. Panic is not what the movies portray it as - panic is a survival instinct. However, what overcomes panic? Training. Training that is minimal at best. I bring this up not to fault the responders -they are, well.. amazing humans- however, I bring this up because too many Emergency Managers remove this element from the equation. Emotions are running very high and this is going to cause somewhat of a response lag because there is little training to overcome it (specific training for this type of incident), there is little information and their family is in immediate danger. It is not to fault the responders, it is simply a reality that further complicates an already horrific situation.  

So now let's take all of the above information into account. There is a plethora of aspects to this type of event, however, the Thread was addressing why they let it burn. Part of the reason this was allowed to burn was simply due to the fact that resources to fight the fire were not available, information to determine the best course forward was slim and -most importantly- the life of the responders must also be taken into account. First Responders are scarce. We all want to believe that there is an endless supply of emergency personnel, but the truth is that emergency personnel are scarce. The time it takes to train these personnel is intensive and it takes even longer to season a responder. As such, Emergency Personnel lives are taken into account -or should be- in all responses.

The main reason, however, was there was simply no other choice. The population likes to believe that all emergencies can be tamed and brought under control with the proper resources. Likewise, the population tends to believe that resources for handling emergencies are unlimited. Neither of these assumptions are even remotely true. The truth is -sometimes- you have to make very tough decisions. Tough decisions such as sacrifice a 500M radius area to save a mile radius area. Sometimes these decisions are simply due to a lack of resources. Sometimes it is due to the fact that the nature of the emergency was simply too damaging. 

Either way, the full scope of this disaster is not even close to being understood.

 

 

[Rtd208]

Singing.

Done.

[IrishRob17]

On 1/12/2023 at 6:04 AM, Rtd208 said:

Singing begins.

 

 

37 minutes ago, Rtd208 said:

Singing.

Done.

Noted…again

[coastalplainsnowman]

If this lack of winter keeps up, and doesn't happen again in future years to this extent for awhile, do you think this season will be referred to as 'The Year Without a Winter' or do the Christmas week cold snap and the super-brief recent cold snap disqualify it?

For comparison, looks like the 1816 Year without a Summer did have some brief bouts of 90+ weather, so maybe it wouldn't be disqualifying.

[JustinRP37]

57 minutes ago, IrishRob17 said:

 

Noted…again

We had a few intermissions. She had to warm up again  

[Stormlover74]

56 minutes ago, coastalplainsnowman said:

If this lack of winter keeps up, and doesn't happen again in future years to this extent for awhile, do you think this season will be referred to as 'The Year Without a Winter' or do the Christmas week cold snap and the super-brief recent cold snap disqualify it?

For comparison, looks like the 1816 Year without a Summer did have some brief bouts of 90+ weather, so maybe it wouldn't be disqualifying.

Less than 1" of snow qualifies 

[psv88]

1 hour ago, coastalplainsnowman said:

If this lack of winter keeps up, and doesn't happen again in future years to this extent for awhile, do you think this season will be referred to as 'The Year Without a Winter' or do the Christmas week cold snap and the super-brief recent cold snap disqualify it?

For comparison, looks like the 1816 Year without a Summer did have some brief bouts of 90+ weather, so maybe it wouldn't be disqualifying.

Definitely the year without a winter 

[LibertyBell]

5 hours ago, USCG RS said:

 

Inciteful - Yes. But still missing a plethora of things - some of which I believe could provide even further light on the situation. 

1) You had a local Fire Dept, ill-equipped to handle an actual Haz Mat Emergency. While all FDs are trained on Hazmat, etc.. the smaller the Dept, the less training you have for a major Haz Mat incident. Even Class 1 (ISO Class) Depts are many times ill prepared to handle the immediate aftermath of a Haz Mat incident of this scope. The immediate responding FD/EMS/PD was from a town of 5K persons with -I believe- an all-volunteer Dept. These volunteers work other jobs for a living and dedicate their time to assist the community. As such, they are rarely trained to handle anything outside of a "routine" emergency (Ie - House Fire, Motor Vehicle Accident/Crash, Medical, Etc). Compound that with the fact that this small Dept likely has little in the way of funding for these types of emergencies and well - You're crippled out of the gate. 

2) All emergencies are Inherently local. This is what is taught -and I believe to be true - in the National Response Framework (NRF), which are the guidelines provided to all local Emergency Managers for how to react to all Emergencies. So how does this affect East Palestine, Ohio? 2 Ways. First, we already discussed that the responding Dept is ill equipped and funded for this type of emergency. Secondly, the NRF would then provide a manner in which to scale up the Response. So, the Incident Commander (IC) -Sometimes a Unified Commander (UC) depending on the set up of the response- has to quickly determine the nature of the incident and how to properly scale; Ie what is needed to scale. In this case, you would need to ascertain the scope of the Incident, what is the cause of the fire, how you are going to need to respond to the fire and what other hazards are around. A seasoned IC can relatively quickly ascertain this, however, you have a unique situation (Serious HazMat) with a likely skeleton crew (Volunteers who have to respond during working hours) with a crew that may or may not have ever even been trained for this type of incident (and by training - I mean actual training, not mandated slide training). Therefore, the IC is at an immediate disadvantage and is incredibly outmatched with regards to resources needed. So, we scale up. The closest ISO 2 dept (ISO is 1-10, with 1 being the best and most ready to respond - 2 is a pretty good ISO) is Youngstown, approximately 20 miles away. Then you have Pittsburgh (ISO-1) about 50 miles away and Cleveland (ISO-2) about 85 miles away. This leads to my next point;

3) The Depts listed above are well funded and equipped to handle these types of incidents (or as well as a local FD can be), however you have several issues. First, it is going to take time to mobilize these units. Dispatch has to liaison with these Depts and explain the situation. Assuming there are Mutual Aid Contracts in place, the process is somewhat streamlined. Without these contracts (50/50 chance), the process becomes further complicated. No contract means no formalized manner in which the mutual aid unit responds, no promise of response, and most importantly - the mutual aid Dept may not have a standardized manner in which they can scale themselves up to meet the need of the requesting Dept. However, let us assume that the mutual aid Dept. has an agreement. The mutual aid Dept. is going to have to call in reserves/persons not working. Perhaps, one unit can be immediately spared, however, remember, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Etc, are all busy Depts and they are scheduled to handle their own depts issues -with little wiggle room to spare. Now, most mutual aid agreements are penned based on the idea that a large fire (Non-Hazmat), large Motor Vehicle Crash, etc has occurred. These agreements are not penned with the idea of a multi-state Haz Mat disaster in mind. It is not that this is never thought of, it is simply the fact that a response of this magnitude is going to need a plethora of depts (National, State, Local, Federal & even Private). But I digress, let us pull it back from this Rabbit hole for a minute. Mutual Aids are going to take time. Haz Mat Mutual Aids are going to take longer; and this is not even mentioning the Federal Mutual Aid Response needed. So what happens now? You have an IC on the scene of a nightmare, with very little information, significantly limited resources and a ticking time bomb. Let us go to the next point.

4) Information. Information is scarce when you first pull up. It has likely been dispatched as a train derailment. Beyond that -most likely- the First Responders are gathering the info on their own. So, Responders pull up to a scene. You have a fire and you have a massive derailment. We do not know what chemicals we have, what is burning and how many injured/casualties. First responders are looking for placards, however, they may not even be able to find them at first. Remember, this is a derailment. the placards could be damaged, missing, destroyed, obscured, etc. Then, you have to communicate with the hauling company, which also takes time. What is on this train? How many of the substances are on this train? Etc. Etc. Etc. While the placards - if located- will tell you the substances, it will tell you how much. Likewise, the manifest is on every train. However, again, this is a derailment. Is the conductor alive? Can they reach the cargo manifest? Is it damaged. Heck, is it complete (I have been on many scenes where, well, let's just say humans cut corners and/or make mistakes). Information is scarce. That withstanding, the Thread in question explains very well how the information is obtained and how it works from here with that regard. 

5) Humans are responding. Humans whose family live in the town they are trying to protect. Humans are outmatched, underfunded, overworked, and not even paid. Humans, who are fighting panic. We all become scared and we all fight panic. Panic is not what the movies portray it as - panic is a survival instinct. However, what overcomes panic? Training. Training that is minimal at best. I bring this up not to fault the responders -they are, well.. amazing humans- however, I bring this up because too many Emergency Managers remove this element from the equation. Emotions are running very high and this is going to cause somewhat of a response lag because there is little training to overcome it (specific training for this type of incident), there is little information and their family is in immediate danger. It is not to fault the responders, it is simply a reality that further complicates an already horrific situation.  

So now let's take all of the above information into account. There is a plethora of aspects to this type of event, however, the Thread was addressing why they let it burn. Part of the reason this was allowed to burn was simply due to the fact that resources to fight the fire were not available, information to determine the best course forward was slim and -most importantly- the life of the responders must also be taken into account. First Responders are scarce. We all want to believe that there is an endless supply of emergency personnel, but the truth is that emergency personnel are scarce. The time it takes to train these personnel is intensive and it takes even longer to season a responder. As such, Emergency Personnel lives are taken into account -or should be- in all responses.

The main reason, however, was there was simply no other choice. The population likes to believe that all emergencies can be tamed and brought under control with the proper resources. Likewise, the population tends to believe that resources for handling emergencies are unlimited. Neither of these assumptions are even remotely true. The truth is -sometimes- you have to make very tough decisions. Tough decisions such as sacrifice a 500M radius area to save a mile radius area. Sometimes these decisions are simply due to a lack of resources. Sometimes it is due to the fact that the nature of the emergency was simply too damaging. 

Either way, the full scope of this disaster is not even close to being understood.

 

 

I found it really alarming when I found out Norfolk Southern is so happy they are now allowed to make trains longer than they should be and that particular train had a nickname that made it pretty clear they knew it was a ticking time bomb.

They fully deserve the incoming lawsuits.

[Brasiluvsnow]

6 hours ago, USCG RS said:

 

Inciteful - Yes. But still missing a plethora of things - some of which I believe could provide even further light on the situation. 

1) You had a local Fire Dept, ill-equipped to handle an actual Haz Mat Emergency. While all FDs are trained on Hazmat, etc.. the smaller the Dept, the less training you have for a major Haz Mat incident. Even Class 1 (ISO Class) Depts are many times ill prepared to handle the immediate aftermath of a Haz Mat incident of this scope. The immediate responding FD/EMS/PD was from a town of 5K persons with -I believe- an all-volunteer Dept. These volunteers work other jobs for a living and dedicate their time to assist the community. As such, they are rarely trained to handle anything outside of a "routine" emergency (Ie - House Fire, Motor Vehicle Accident/Crash, Medical, Etc). Compound that with the fact that this small Dept likely has little in the way of funding for these types of emergencies and well - You're crippled out of the gate. 

2) All emergencies are Inherently local. This is what is taught -and I believe to be true - in the National Response Framework (NRF), which are the guidelines provided to all local Emergency Managers for how to react to all Emergencies. So how does this affect East Palestine, Ohio? 2 Ways. First, we already discussed that the responding Dept is ill equipped and funded for this type of emergency. Secondly, the NRF would then provide a manner in which to scale up the Response. So, the Incident Commander (IC) -Sometimes a Unified Commander (UC) depending on the set up of the response- has to quickly determine the nature of the incident and how to properly scale; Ie what is needed to scale. In this case, you would need to ascertain the scope of the Incident, what is the cause of the fire, how you are going to need to respond to the fire and what other hazards are around. A seasoned IC can relatively quickly ascertain this, however, you have a unique situation (Serious HazMat) with a likely skeleton crew (Volunteers who have to respond during working hours) with a crew that may or may not have ever even been trained for this type of incident (and by training - I mean actual training, not mandated slide training). Therefore, the IC is at an immediate disadvantage and is incredibly outmatched with regards to resources needed. So, we scale up. The closest ISO 2 dept (ISO is 1-10, with 1 being the best and most ready to respond - 2 is a pretty good ISO) is Youngstown, approximately 20 miles away. Then you have Pittsburgh (ISO-1) about 50 miles away and Cleveland (ISO-2) about 85 miles away. This leads to my next point;

3) The Depts listed above are well funded and equipped to handle these types of incidents (or as well as a local FD can be), however you have several issues. First, it is going to take time to mobilize these units. Dispatch has to liaison with these Depts and explain the situation. Assuming there are Mutual Aid Contracts in place, the process is somewhat streamlined. Without these contracts (50/50 chance), the process becomes further complicated. No contract means no formalized manner in which the mutual aid unit responds, no promise of response, and most importantly - the mutual aid Dept may not have a standardized manner in which they can scale themselves up to meet the need of the requesting Dept. However, let us assume that the mutual aid Dept. has an agreement. The mutual aid Dept. is going to have to call in reserves/persons not working. Perhaps, one unit can be immediately spared, however, remember, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Etc, are all busy Depts and they are scheduled to handle their own depts issues -with little wiggle room to spare. Now, most mutual aid agreements are penned based on the idea that a large fire (Non-Hazmat), large Motor Vehicle Crash, etc has occurred. These agreements are not penned with the idea of a multi-state Haz Mat disaster in mind. It is not that this is never thought of, it is simply the fact that a response of this magnitude is going to need a plethora of depts (National, State, Local, Federal & even Private). But I digress, let us pull it back from this Rabbit hole for a minute. Mutual Aids are going to take time. Haz Mat Mutual Aids are going to take longer; and this is not even mentioning the Federal Mutual Aid Response needed. So what happens now? You have an IC on the scene of a nightmare, with very little information, significantly limited resources and a ticking time bomb. Let us go to the next point.

4) Information. Information is scarce when you first pull up. It has likely been dispatched as a train derailment. Beyond that -most likely- the First Responders are gathering the info on their own. So, Responders pull up to a scene. You have a fire and you have a massive derailment. We do not know what chemicals we have, what is burning and how many injured/casualties. First responders are looking for placards, however, they may not even be able to find them at first. Remember, this is a derailment. the placards could be damaged, missing, destroyed, obscured, etc. Then, you have to communicate with the hauling company, which also takes time. What is on this train? How many of the substances are on this train? Etc. Etc. Etc. While the placards - if located- will tell you the substances, it will tell you how much. Likewise, the manifest is on every train. However, again, this is a derailment. Is the conductor alive? Can they reach the cargo manifest? Is it damaged. Heck, is it complete (I have been on many scenes where, well, let's just say humans cut corners and/or make mistakes). Information is scarce. That withstanding, the Thread in question explains very well how the information is obtained and how it works from here with that regard. 

5) Humans are responding. Humans whose family live in the town they are trying to protect. Humans are outmatched, underfunded, overworked, and not even paid. Humans, who are fighting panic. We all become scared and we all fight panic. Panic is not what the movies portray it as - panic is a survival instinct. However, what overcomes panic? Training. Training that is minimal at best. I bring this up not to fault the responders -they are, well.. amazing humans- however, I bring this up because too many Emergency Managers remove this element from the equation. Emotions are running very high and this is going to cause somewhat of a response lag because there is little training to overcome it (specific training for this type of incident), there is little information and their family is in immediate danger. It is not to fault the responders, it is simply a reality that further complicates an already horrific situation.  

So now let's take all of the above information into account. There is a plethora of aspects to this type of event, however, the Thread was addressing why they let it burn. Part of the reason this was allowed to burn was simply due to the fact that resources to fight the fire were not available, information to determine the best course forward was slim and -most importantly- the life of the responders must also be taken into account. First Responders are scarce. We all want to believe that there is an endless supply of emergency personnel, but the truth is that emergency personnel are scarce. The time it takes to train these personnel is intensive and it takes even longer to season a responder. As such, Emergency Personnel lives are taken into account -or should be- in all responses.

The main reason, however, was there was simply no other choice. The population likes to believe that all emergencies can be tamed and brought under control with the proper resources. Likewise, the population tends to believe that resources for handling emergencies are unlimited. Neither of these assumptions are even remotely true. The truth is -sometimes- you have to make very tough decisions. Tough decisions such as sacrifice a 500M radius area to save a mile radius area. Sometimes these decisions are simply due to a lack of resources. Sometimes it is due to the fact that the nature of the emergency was simply too damaging. 

Either way, the full scope of this disaster is not even close to being understood.

 

 

RS, thanks for your input it's appreciated,,,,,5 days after this derailment occurred  ( if not sooner ) officials were telling and encouraging residents " it's ok to return home " = insanity. It has been almost 2 weeks and those people in Ohio are being lied to.

[LibertyBell]

2 hours ago, Brasiluvsnow said:

RS, thanks for your input it's appreciated,,,,,5 days after this derailment occurred  ( if not sooner ) officials were telling and encouraging residents " it's ok to return home " = insanity. It has been almost 2 weeks and those people in Ohio are being lied to.

They should instead tell them about the ones that had to go to the hospital because of respiratory distress, including an entire family.

[Brasiluvsnow]

https://twitter.com/TheChiefNerd/status/1626400083313930240?s=20

[snowman19]

@donsutherland1 This guy is a total crackpot. -5F DC-BOS from 3/1 - 4/15 along with 20+ inches of snow in NYC

[donsutherland1]

2 hours ago, snowman19 said:

@donsutherland1 This guy is a total crackpot. -5F DC-BOS from 3/1 - 4/15 along with 20+ inches of snow in NYC

The extreme forecast appears to be a last-ditch swing for the fences in what has been a disastrous winter forecast in among the warmest winters on record.  Such tweets undermine the credibility of profession, because of the visibility and attention they garner.

With respect to the -5° anomaly/20"+ snowfall idea, I posted previously on that matter for NYC. Overall, the probability of such an outcome remains exceptionally low. There is no support on the most recent ECMWF weeklies or CFSv2 for the kind of sustained cold required.

The verification tweet for mid-November through December is not exactly accurate. He referred to "big end-game, cold." Yet, the area of 1° or more below normal anomalies for this period was quite small. Had there not been the short-lived severe Arctic blast in late December, that area would have been even smaller. Nevertheless, the anomalies fall far short of what was described.

With regard to his "wishcast" tweet, there is a material omission. He had expected severe cold for the January 10-30 period.

The January 10-30, 2023 outcome could not have been more different from his idea:

Boston: Mean Temperature: 37.5° (8th warmest); Snowfall: 6.4"
New York City: Mean Temperature: 42.0° (3rd warmest); Snowfall: Trace
Philadelphia: Mean Temperature: 41.6° (7th warmest); Snowfall: None
Washington, DC: Mean Temperature: 43.1° (tied 12th warmest); Snowfall: Trace

All four cities wound up with among their warmest Januaries on record. Boston (5th warmest), New York City (1st warmest), Philadelphia (2nd warmest), and Washington, DC (3rd warmest).

Why have things gone so badly? Two possible issues may be involved:

1) His "analog" method

2) His approach to using the guidance

Analogs can provide useful insight when three conditions exist: they are selected in an objective fashion (different people should be able to reproduce them from a consistent methodology), their limitations (lack of synoptic scale value, sample size, uncertainty) are respected, and reasonable comparability exists (relatively stable climate) across the period of time. Today, the climate is warming and it is notably warmer than it was even a few decades ago. The dynamic warming and extent of warming that has occurred have undermined analog comparability and reduced valid analog pools to very small sample sizes.

His approach to using models and ensembles is flawed. He has often suggested that he arrives at conclusions and then chooses the guidance that favors those conclusions. Two or three decades ago when the guidance had much less skill, the hazards of that approach would have been less evident. The noise of model error would have drowned out the error from a flawed approach to using the models. Today, the hazards of that flawed approach are inescapable. In general, one should look at the evidence, including the guidance, and only then reach conclusions. One should not reach preconceived conclusions and then essentially filter evidence simply because it confirms one's ideas. Confirmation bias is lethal to good analyses and decision-making. It also undermines the possibility of utilizing lessons from post-verification assessments.

Overall, long-range forecasting remains a low-skill endeavor. However, an inherently flawed approach to forecasting can greatly increase the frequency and magnitude of one's errors. I suspect that's the bigger story here.

 

[LibertyBell]

43 minutes ago, donsutherland1 said:

The extreme forecast appears to be a last-ditch swing for the fences in what has been a disastrous winter forecast in among the warmest winters on record.  Such tweets undermine the credibility of profession, because of the visibility and attention they garner.

With respect to the -5° anomaly/20"+ snowfall idea, I posted previously on that matter for NYC. Overall, the probability of such an outcome remains exceptionally low. There is no support on the most recent ECMWF weeklies or CFSv2 for the kind of sustained cold required.

The verification tweet for mid-November through December is not exactly accurate. He referred to "big end-game, cold." Yet, the area of 1° or more below normal anomalies for this period was quite small. Had there not been the short-lived severe Arctic blast in late December, that area would have been even smaller. Nevertheless, the anomalies fall far short of what was described.

With regard to his "wishcast" tweet, there is a material omission. He had expected severe cold for the January 10-30 period.

The January 10-30, 2023 outcome could not have been more different from his idea:

Boston: Mean Temperature: 37.5° (8th warmest); Snowfall: 6.4"
New York City: Mean Temperature: 42.0° (3rd warmest); Snowfall: Trace
Philadelphia: Mean Temperature: 41.6° (7th warmest); Snowfall: None
Washington, DC: Mean Temperature: 43.1° (tied 12th warmest); Snowfall: Trace

All four cities wound up with among their warmest Januaries on record. Boston (5th warmest), New York City (1st warmest), Philadelphia (2nd warmest), and Washington, DC (3rd warmest).

Why have things gone so badly? Two possible issues may be involved:

1) His "analog" method

2) His approach to using the guidance

Analogs can provide useful insight when three conditions exist: they are selected in an objective fashion (different people should be able to reproduce them from a consistent methodology), their limitations (lack of synoptic scale value, sample size, uncertainty) are respected, and reasonable comparability exists (relatively stable climate) across the period of time. Today, the climate is warming and it is notably warmer than it was even a few decades ago. The dynamic warming and extent of warming that has occurred have undermined analog comparability and reduced valid analog pools to very small sample sizes.

His approach to using models and ensembles is flawed. He has often suggested that he arrives at conclusions and then chooses the guidance that favors those conclusions. Two or three decades ago when the guidance had much less skill, the hazards of that approach would have been less evident. The noise of model error would have drowned out the error from a flawed approach to using the models. Today, the hazards of that flawed approach are inescapable. In general, one should look at the evidence, including the guidance, and only then reach conclusions. One should not reach preconceived conclusions and then essentially filter evidence simply because it confirms one's ideas. Confirmation bias is lethal to good analyses and decision-making. It also undermines the possibility of utilizing lessons from post-verification assessments.

Overall, long-range forecasting remains a low-skill endeavor. However, an inherently flawed approach to forecasting can greatly increase the frequency and magnitude of one's errors. I suspect that's the bigger story here.

 

I quit reading JB after 2001-02

No one should have read anything written by him after that debacle.

 

[donsutherland1]

23 minutes ago, LibertyBell said:

I quit reading JB after 2001-02

No one should have read anything written by him after that debacle.

 

He used to be a good forecaster. Even the best ones can make big errors from time to time. He has changed dramatically since around 2010. 

I focused on the two big flaws that now appear apparent in his forecasting framework. I personally hope his better days from the past won’t be forgotten.

[etudiant]

55 minutes ago, LibertyBell said:

I quit reading JB after 2001-02

No one should have read anything written by him after that debacle.

 

I started following him because of Sandy, which he evaluated correctly, plus he held on to his stance despite extensive criticism.

Don't follow him any longer, $270/yr is too rich for my blood, but I respect his insights. The concern is, as Don noted above, that his approach may be misleading him in the warming climate we are seeing.

[Rjay]

5 hours ago, etudiant said:

I started following him because of Sandy, which he evaluated correctly, plus he held on to his stance despite extensive criticism.

Don't follow him any longer, $270/yr is too rich for my blood, but I respect his insights. The concern is, as Don noted above, that his approach may be misleading him in the warming climate we are seeing.

I disregard his thoughts.  You can't go full weenie every time and you can't ignore climate change. 

[Rtd208]

[donsutherland1]

In the world we inhabit, some things are eminently predictable. The sun rises and sets. Dropped objects fall to the ground. The tide rises and falls. And, as @snowman19 reminded readers just this morning--at least those willing to listen--modeled snowstorms disappear into the abyss of winter 2022-2023.

It has long been said that there is always change. But not for the finite time that marks the saddest winters ever known to those who suffer through them. There is something special and sinister about winters such as 1918-1919, 1972-1973, 2001-2002, 2019-2020, and perhaps 2022-2023.  During those "ratter" winters, opportunities for snowstorms are missed. The snow does not fall.

Nevertheless, some refuse to accept the reality of the circumstances in which they find themselves. They cling fast to hollow aphorisms about the snow being "delayed but not denied." They are seduced by the siren call of MJO charts with low long-range verification scores and often low correlation outcomes. They are smitten by dusty analogs of a colder, snowier world that once was.

The snow drought persists day after day. Sleighs go unused. There is no romance to be found in such winters.

The hourglass empties. The sun's warmth grows. Spring blossoms begin to unfurl their colors to herald the coming change in seasons.

The ship of "Winter 2022-2023" has now crossed mid-February. Central Park's barren ground has seen just 0.4" of snow. Even as the forsaken ship flounders on the stormy seas of warmth, a voice cries out from its Twitter watchtower: "Big snow, severe cold on the horizon!" Its confidence is unmistakable.

It seems possessed of the certainty that only exists in such matters as the rising and setting of the sun. It appears that this voice has never felt the sting of its own countless busted forecasts for cold and snow that lie in the ship's wake as far back as the eye can see. It is undeterred that the analogs on which its forecasts are based have long ago melted in the rising warmth of climate change rendering them useless. It proclaims for New York City, "5° below normal, 20" of snow, from March 1 to April 15!"

That the horizon is perpetually shrouded by the mist of uncertainty is irrelevant. Its confidence is complete. Instead, what seems increasingly likely is that this stricken ship will sink beneath the battering waves of winter futility long before it ever reaches a cold and snowy destination.

There are rare miracles. The 5" snowstorm on March 22, 1998 after 0.5" had fallen all winter until then offers one example. Hope has not yet succumbed to hopelessness.

The story of Winter 2022-2023 is nearly finished. Its last pages will be written over the next two months. What will those pages say? How will the story end? Will the ship of winter be lost?

[Rtd208]

 

[Nibor]

I guess this is a good thing to reflect on in this winter of misery.

[MJO812]

I'm still looking at my phone when I wake up to see any changes with the models 

[donsutherland1]

In general, as noted on a number of occasions in the past, one should make or accept extreme forecasts without sufficient evidence for such an outcome. Without sufficient evidence, contextual understanding, and respect for uncertainty in the extended range, such forecasts are almost always doomed to fail.

The March 1-April 15 forecast anomaly of 5° below normal for New York City provides the latest example. March has yet to begin, but some of the ensembles now extend into the opening days of March.

For an illustration of where things stand, the EPS forecasts a March 1-6 anomaly of 0.7° below normal. That the EPS is also potentially evolving toward a warmer pattern is set aside. In fact, by 360 hours, the 2/20 0z run shows a 500 mb pattern similar to that of March 9, 2006 that preceded a period of above normal temperatures. At that range, a lot can still change.

But going back to the forecast -0.7° anomaly, if that anomaly verifies, then the remainder of the period March 7-April 15 would need to average 5.6° below normal to achieve a 5° below normal average for March 1-April 15. Put simply, as March approaches, extent of cold needed to achieve the extreme forecast will need to become even more extreme.

In sum, unless overwhelming and credible evidence is presented, extreme forecasts over long timeframes are little more than speculation. There is no skill involved. There is no insight that informs them. The probability of their verifying is very low. If anything, they are noise seeking to grab the attention of social media, not legitimate attempts to inform the public.

The forecast in question will be verified at the end of the timeframe with periodic updates for purposes of illustrating the important points concerning extreme forecasts made in the absence of sufficient and credible evidence.

 

[Stormlover74]

I'm starting to think the call for 5 below average in March is in jeopardy

[Brian5671]

3 hours ago, Stormlover74 said:

I'm starting to think the call for 5 below average in March is in jeopardy

When was the last time we had -5 for ANY month?   Feb 2015?

[vegan_edible]

5 hours ago, Stormlover74 said:

I'm starting to think the call for 5 below average in March is in jeopardy

LMAOOOOOO 

 

 

 

 

ive said it before, we gon' get em next year 

[LibertyBell]

5 hours ago, Brian5671 said:

When was the last time we had -5 for ANY month?   Feb 2015?

our record low from today is from Feb 2015....2 degrees here

Feb 2015 also had the latest single degree low in my memory.....on the last day, the 28th!  I wonder when the last time is we reached single digits in March?

 

[Winterweatherlover]

I think the long range GFS needs to be banned. I posted this here instead of the February thread for amusement and to not confuse people from an actual forecast.

 

https://www.pivotalweather.com/model.php?m=gfs&p=snku_acc-imp&rh=2023022018&fh=207&r=us_ne&dpdt=&mc= 

[Winterweatherlover]

lol at this model, I hope this is ok to post for fun but this winter is so horrible we need humor.    

https://www.pivotalweather.com/model.php?m=gfs&p=prateptype_cat-imp&rh=2023022112&fh=33&r=us_ne&dpdt=&mc=

 

 

[etudiant]

Is there any model which predicted the mild winter we are enjoying in NYC?

What surprises me is that none of them appear to have adjusted to the reality of a really low snow environment.

The Bastardi 'Hail Mary' March chill forecast is right in line with all the other models, just a bit more extreme in its focus on the model rather than what's actually happening. Qualitatively though they are all in the same boat, at least as far as I can tell. Maybe we need a new paradigm for modeling the seasonal forecasts.