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August 12-? Severe Weather


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It would be interesting to learn exactly what the coordinators were using for weather information, how they were using it, and what the plans were. Right now so much is speculation. As you said, did they have a plan for lightning, a possible tornado, etc? Right now nobody really knows, but the information at this juncture points to no.

Here is a link to a news story WISH: http://wish.m0bl.net/w/news/story/35399731/

It states in the story that they (reporters) requested the procedures for severe weather during the fair. it was a one page 9 bullet document I think (on my phone so hard to bounce back and forth). Now I don't know the details of this document but I know 9 bullet points isn't going into anything in detail. I believe these procedures were only for the buildings and not the grandstand.

If I could get my hands on that document it would explain a lot I think. I know as a meteorologist in Indy im willing to do anything to help out the fair next year if it was requested. Anything to make sure the incident doesn't happen again.

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Here is a link to a news story WISH: http://wish.m0bl.net...story/35399731/

It states in the story that they (reporters) requested the procedures for severe weather during the fair. it was a one page 9 bullet document I think (on my phone so hard to bounce back and forth). Now I don't know the details of this document but I know 9 bullet points isn't going into anything in detail. I believe these procedures were only for the buildings and not the grandstand.

If I could get my hands on that document it would explain a lot I think. I know as a meteorologist in Indy im willing to do anything to help out the fair next year if it was requested. Anything to make sure the incident doesn't happen again.

Wow...

Just read it. Yes, that is not even close to sufficient...

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It would be interesting to learn exactly what the coordinators were using for weather information, how they were using it, and what the plans were. Right now so much is speculation. As you said, did they have a plan for lightning, a possible tornado, etc? Right now nobody really knows, but the information at this juncture points to no.

No idea what the coordinators were planning or how they were using it, but here are the details of communication, provided by the Indiana State Police, between the Fair and the NWS.

Taken from here: http://www.jconline.com/article/20110815/NEWS/108150323/From-watch-warning-30-minutes

Detailed timeline:

5:30 p.m. The National Weather Service is contacted by the Indiana State Fair staff for a weather update.

5:57 p.m. The NWS issues a severe thunderstorm watch for all of Central Indiana.

6 p.m. The NWS is contacted a second time for an by Indiana State Fair staff for a weather update.

7 p.m. The NWS is contacted a third time and by Indiana State Fair staff for a weather update. NWS advises a thunderstorm would be at the fairgrounds between 9 and 9:30 p.m. NWS advised the storm would contain heavy rain, lightning, strong winds and 1-to-2 inch hail.

7:04 p.m. First auto-dialer message sent to State Fair staff regarding severe thunderstorm watch.

8 p.m. The National Weather Service is contacted a fourth time by Indiana State Fair staff for a weather update. NWS advised the storm would arrive at the fairgrounds at approximately 9:15p.m. and The storm would contain small hail and 40 mph winds.

8:09 p.m. Second auto-dialer weather alert to State Fair staff regarding severe thunderstorm watch.

8:30 p.m. Additional Indiana State Police moved to the grandstand to assist onsite Indiana State Police personnel and ESG Security in the evacuation of the concert attendees.

8:39 p.m. The NWSissues a severe thunderstorm warning for Marion County.

8:45 p.m. A preliminary announcement is made by the concert emcee advising the concert attendees that severe weather is moving into the area. The announcement includes instructions on how and where to seek shelter.

8:49 p.m. Stage collapses.

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No idea what the coordinators were planning or how they were using it, but here are the details of communication, provided by the Indiana State Police, between the Fair and the NWS.

Taken from here: http://www.jconline....ning-30-minutes

Detailed timeline:

5:30 p.m. The National Weather Service is contacted by the Indiana State Fair staff for a weather update.

5:57 p.m. The NWS issues a severe thunderstorm watch for all of Central Indiana.

6 p.m. The NWS is contacted a second time for an by Indiana State Fair staff for a weather update.

7 p.m. The NWS is contacted a third time and by Indiana State Fair staff for a weather update. NWS advises a thunderstorm would be at the fairgrounds between 9 and 9:30 p.m. NWS advised the storm would contain heavy rain, lightning, strong winds and 1-to-2 inch hail.

7:04 p.m. First auto-dialer message sent to State Fair staff regarding severe thunderstorm watch.

8 p.m. The National Weather Service is contacted a fourth time by Indiana State Fair staff for a weather update. NWS advised the storm would arrive at the fairgrounds at approximately 9:15p.m. and The storm would contain small hail and 40 mph winds.

8:09 p.m. Second auto-dialer weather alert to State Fair staff regarding severe thunderstorm watch.

8:30 p.m. Additional Indiana State Police moved to the grandstand to assist onsite Indiana State Police personnel and ESG Security in the evacuation of the concert attendees.

8:39 p.m. The NWSissues a severe thunderstorm warning for Marion County.

8:45 p.m. A preliminary announcement is made by the concert emcee advising the concert attendees that severe weather is moving into the area. The announcement includes instructions on how and where to seek shelter.

8:49 p.m. Stage collapses.

10 minutes (based off the warning) certainly is not a ton of time, but it would have made a world of difference were plans made to move people out right then. Doesn't help the expected TOA was for 915, but even that gives an entire hour and 15 minutes for plans to get set into motion (49 mins until the actual event did occur). Way too much time to be sitting on their hands waiting. Nobody is to blame and it obviously came down to epic misunderstanding and a general lack of weather knowledge/preparedness by folks who aren't expected to know anything about weather. But clearly this was avoidable.

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10 minutes (based off the warning) certainly is not a ton of time, but it would have made a world of difference were plans made to move people out right then. Doesn't help the expected TOA was for 915, but even that gives an entire hour and 15 minutes for plans to get set into motion. Way too much time to be sitting on their hands waiting. Nobody is to blame and it obviously came down to epic misunderstanding and a general lack of weather knowledge/preparedness by folks who aren't expected to know anything about weather. But clearly this was avoidable.

No 10 minutes isn't a lot time. But from that timeline, the communication (from the NWS) well ahead of the warning issuance (for the potential of severe weather) was given to the Fair staff. What they decided to do with that is anyone's guess at this point. I understand there are a ton of logistics/variables to moving a lot of people around in a relatively short amount of time, but it seems to me that it (severe threat "well ahead" of the actual warning) should have been taken a little more seriously. Easy to say after the fact no doubt, but sometimes it gets a little tiring being reactive rather than proactive. But that's another story for another day I suppose. Live and learn. Hopefully the learning part is real and steps are taken to prevent future tragedies.

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10 minutes (based off the warning) certainly is not a ton of time, but it would have made a world of difference were plans made to move people out right then. Doesn't help the expected TOA was for 915, but even that gives an entire hour and 15 minutes for plans to get set into motion (49 mins until the actual event did occur). Way too much time to be sitting on their hands waiting. Nobody is to blame and it obviously came down to epic misunderstanding and a general lack of weather knowledge/preparedness by folks who aren't expected to know anything about weather. But clearly this was avoidable.

You could have had the collapse zone evacuated in less than 90 seconds. Start from the points of highest danger and work out. I would have worked from the front of the collapse zone, and the rear (highest) portiion of the grandstand seating and worked in to the middle. Row by row with enough herders to keep things moving, you could have cleared that place out with time to spare.

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So many different aspects to consider here, but just commenting on this alone, the estimated time of arrival should be of little overall consideration, IMO. Besides the fact it may have been issued for what was expected to be the "most severe" part of the storm (which may not have been the gust front), it seems this stage very well may have collapsed without severe wind criteria even being met. If the event coordinators were solely using warnings for all decision making (which I doubt), it should have been based off the warning issuance alone, not the estimated TOA (i.e., plans should have been made to evacuate immediately after the warning went out). Why wait around and evacuate at the last moment? If they issued a tornado warning with an estimated TOA, should they wait until the very last second to evacuate? Should they wait until 5 minutes until the tornado arrives then evacuate at the final moment? Definitely not! That said, there were many flaws in this whole event, and it would have been advantageous to have an NWS IMET or some private consultant giving more direct support services to event coordinators/emergency officials. That would negate any "lost in translation" issues, and it would allow for meteorological support not covered by severe wx warnings (i.e., high wind gusts but less than severe criteria), lighting threats, etc. What has irked me from day one was all the sidestepping by upper level officials claiming this was completely unpredictable, fluky, and unavoidable. That is just not the case.

To the first bolded part, I suspect that was the case as well. Mind you I have also not seen any radar data besides what has been posted on various blog entries (Jim LaDue, Mike Smith, etc). I know also that this can vary office to office as part of WFO warning decision ideologies. Some folks are warning on the most severe part of the storm, while others (and I would probably include myself in this category) warn for the onset of severe conditions. This is easy with something like a tornado, as that is clearly what you want to provide TOAs for, but severe thunderstorms are definitely much more ambiguous and have a wide variance from office to office and even forecaster to forecaster.

As an example for those who are unfamiliar here is how WarnGen operates during the warning decision process. The forecaster interrogating radar data starts the program and must drag a point or a line to the feature of interest. Then they use a few frames of radar data to get a speed and direction of that feature. Once that is done the forecaster will then add the polygon to the track and manually adjust the edges to cover the severe threat. Other than that it is just selecting the various features of the polygon (type of statement (SVR, TOR, SPS, etc), expected threats (wind speed, hail size), call-to-action statement defined by that office).

If I were warning on a severe hailstorm the idea would be to track the leading edge of significant reflectivity, not the bullseye, as the severe hail will likely start before the max dBZ arrives at your location. Wind can be a little more difficult because the gust front can sometimes be non severe while the stronger winds lay back with the rainfall. Generally speaking, I try and track the gust front (as non severe wind can still produce damage, been burned by it before) and update the warning with frequent SVSs to clear areas behind the heavy rainfall when I'm positive they are no longer producing strong winds. There are also valid reasons for tracking the most significant severe threat in a storm. Say a 80+ mph producing storm you may want to track that feature, with a CTA or phrase stating strong winds may precede the storm by many miles.

Getting back to your second bolded statement, again I totally agree with you. I think with the unfortunate outcome there is some desire to make this a more significant weather event than it actually was. Judging from the video, I don't think this was an isolated significant wind gust or gustnado that toppled the stage. I agree with Jim LaDue's methodology and thought process in trying to determine wind speeds, and agree that they were probably sub-severe when it collapsed. A 45 knot peak gust can do significant damage when strength of structure and exposure combine in the wrong way.

As I alluded to above, I had a 45 knot wind gust completely destroy one and significantly damage two other hangars at KDBQ only a few hundred yards from that observation. Though not in the warning, they were within a mile of it and unfortunately the hangar doors were broadside to the wind gust. Once they failed it was fairly easy to blow the first hangar apart. Similarly, I think that the stage canvas acted much like a sail and caught a lot of that particular wind gust, and once the rigging twisted the strength was completely compromised. The only fluky part of it would probably be the wind direction. Though a general westerly gust would be most likely considering the storm orientation, a more southwesterly gust would have probably sent the rigging toppling away from the crowd.

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To the first bolded part, I suspect that was the case as well. Mind you I have also not seen any radar data besides what has been posted on various blog entries (Jim LaDue, Mike Smith, etc). I know also that this can vary office to office as part of WFO warning decision ideologies. Some folks are warning on the most severe part of the storm, while others (and I would probably include myself in this category) warn for the onset of severe conditions. This is easy with something like a tornado, as that is clearly what you want to provide TOAs for, but severe thunderstorms are definitely much more ambiguous and have a wide variance from office to office and even forecaster to forecaster.

As an example for those who are unfamiliar here is how WarnGen operates during the warning decision process. The forecaster interrogating radar data starts the program and must drag a point or a line to the feature of interest. Then they use a few frames of radar data to get a speed and direction of that feature. Once that is done the forecaster will then add the polygon to the track and manually adjust the edges to cover the severe threat. Other than that it is just selecting the various features of the polygon (type of statement (SVR, TOR, SPS, etc), expected threats (wind speed, hail size), call-to-action statement defined by that office).

If I were warning on a severe hailstorm the idea would be to track the leading edge of significant reflectivity, not the bullseye, as the severe hail will likely start before the max dBZ arrives at your location. Wind can be a little more difficult because the gust front can sometimes be non severe while the stronger winds lay back with the rainfall. Generally speaking, I try and track the gust front (as non severe wind can still produce damage, been burned by it before) and update the warning with frequent SVSs to clear areas behind the heavy rainfall when I'm positive they are no longer producing strong winds. There are also valid reasons for tracking the most significant severe threat in a storm. Say a 80+ mph producing storm you may want to track that feature, with a CTA or phrase stating strong winds may precede the storm by many miles.

Getting back to your second bolded statement, again I totally agree with you. I think with the unfortunate outcome there is some desire to make this a more significant weather event than it actually was. Judging from the video, I don't think this was an isolated significant wind gust or gustnado that toppled the stage. I agree with Jim LaDue's methodology and thought process in trying to determine wind speeds, and agree that they were probably sub-severe when it collapsed. A 45 knot peak gust can do significant damage when strength of structure and exposure combine in the wrong way.

As I alluded to above, I had a 45 knot wind gust completely destroy one and significantly damage two other hangars at KDBQ only a few hundred yards from that observation. Though not in the warning, they were within a mile of it and unfortunately the hangar doors were broadside to the wind gust. Once they failed it was fairly easy to blow the first hangar apart. Similarly, I think that the stage canvas acted much like a sail and caught a lot of that particular wind gust, and once the rigging twisted the strength was completely compromised. The only fluky part of it would probably be the wind direction. Though a general westerly gust would be most likely considering the storm orientation, a more southwesterly gust would have probably sent the rigging toppling away from the crowd.

Thanks for the insight oceanst. BTW how is Maine treating you? Glad you still head over here to post!

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In the wake of the tragedy in Indy last Saturday, yet another stage collapse caused by a storm during an outdoor concert--this time in Belgium during their Pukkelpop music festival slated to feature the likes of the Foo Fighters and Eminem:

http://www.wfmz.com/Station/Stage-collapse-kills-5-at-Belgium-music-fest/-/121346/412070/-/t5ng1u/-/index.html

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Heard that a 6th person has died from the collapse in Indy.

The 6th death was Jenny Haskell who grew up in Farmland (where I'm from), graduated from Monroe Central High School and was a senior at Ball State. Needless to say it has really impacted our community. The community and high school came together last night for a candlelight vigil praying for her recovery. Definitely hits way to close to home.

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Baro, do you know if there are any ratings floating around for this or the other tornado for the 11th?

000

NWUS53 KLBF 191650

LSRLBF

PRELIMINARY LOCAL STORM REPORT

NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE NORTH PLATTE NE

1149 AM CDT FRI AUG 19 2011

..TIME... ...EVENT... ...CITY LOCATION... ...LAT.LON...

..DATE... ....MAG.... ..COUNTY LOCATION..ST.. ...SOURCE....

..REMARKS..

0805 PM TORNADO 5 SSE WOOD LAKE 42.56N 100.21W

08/11/2011 CHERRY NE PUBLIC

TORNADO DAMAGED TWO TREE GROVES A HALF MILE APART WITH

SEVERAL TREES UPROOTED...NUMEROUS LARGE BRANCHES BROKEN

AND ONE TREE DEBARKED...UPROOTED AND MOVED SOUTH TO A

FENCE LINE. ADDITIONAL DAMAGE INCLUDED THREE 20 FOOT

WINDMILLS DAMAGED AND ONE DESTROYED...TWO MILES OF BARB

WIRE FENCING DAMAGED AND A STEEL CULVERT BROKEN INTO AND

DISPLACED 3/4 MILE DOWSTREAM IN PLUM CREEK. TORNADO ON

THE GROUND AN ESTIMATED 20 MINUTES.

&&

$$

TKECK

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